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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
None are applicable. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 
78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly grant The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company's motion 
to dismiss where Tan sued The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company after the running of the 
statute of limitations, and where the trial court properly found that Tan's amended complaint did 
not relate back to the original complaint that was filed one day prior to the running of the 
limitations period? 
Because "relation back" under Rule 15(c) is a purely legal determination, an appellate 
court reviews a trial court's Rule 15(c) relation back analysis for correctness. Porter v. Fox, 101 
P.3d 371, 379 (Utah Ct App. 2004) ("a correctness standard applies to a trial court's rule 15(c) 
analysis"). In this case, the trial court correctly determined that Tan's amended complaint did 
not relate back to the complaint that Tan filed prior to the running of the statute of limitations 
because Tan did not commit a technical error in naming "Ohio Casualty Group," and because 
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company has no identity of interest with "Ohio Casualty Group." 
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2. Did the trial court properly grant The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company's motion 
to dismiss, concluding that Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not control this 
matter? 
A trial court's determination of whether or not two or more persons are doing business 
together for purposes of Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is "a conclusion of law 
which . . . [is] review[ed] for correctness." Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 
1392 (Utah 1996). Here, the trial court properly ruled that Rule 17(d) did not apply in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by Judge Glenn Iwasaki, Third District 
Court, granting The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the 
statute of limitations had run on Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims and that the amended complaint 
did not relate back to the original complaint filed prior to the running of the limitations period. 
B. The Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Tony Tan and CCI Project Man., Inc., Carl Creer, Fairway 
Marketing Strategies, Inc., and Fairway Sales, LLC (collectively "Tan") filed a lawsuit against 
John Henry Smith Insurance Company and "Ohio Casualty Group." Tan alleged negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, 
and equitable estoppel against both John Henry Smith Insurance Company and "Ohio Casualty 
Group," after coverage was denied on a claim Tan made under a commercial package policy 
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issued to it by The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Tan's claim arose from the theft of 3,580 
scooters owned by Tan on December 11, 2000, from a location not covered by the policy. On 
December 10, 2003, one day before the statute of limitations ran on Tan's claims, Tan filed suit 
("Original Complaint") naming "Ohio Casualty Group." In January 2004, defense counsel filed 
a motion to dismiss on grounds that "Ohio Casualty Group"1 was a service mark, not a legal 
entity, and that a service mark cannot be sued. In response to the first motion to dismiss, Tan 
filed an amended complaint on February 23, 2004 ("Amended Complaint"), naming John Henry 
Smith Insurance Company and The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, and asserting the same 
causes of action as in the Original Complaint. In March 2004, The Ohio Casualty Insurance 
Company filed another motion to dismiss on grounds that Tan failed to sue The Ohio Casualty 
Insurance Company prior to the running of the statute of limitations, and that Tan's Amended 
Complaint did not relate back to the Original Complaint filed against "Ohio Casualty Group." 
The trial court entered an order on October 18, 2004, granting The Ohio Casualty 
Insurance Company's motion to dismiss. The trial court's ruling was based on the following 
grounds: (a) the statute of limitations had expired by the time Tan named the real party in 
interest, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, in Tan's Amended Complaint; (b) Tan failed to 
name the real party in interest when it named "Ohio Casualty Group" in its Original Complaint 
filed before the running of the statute of limitations; (c) Tan's Amended Complaint did not relate 
back, under Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, to the Original Complaint because 
1
 The actual name of the service mark at issue is "The Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance Companies." Tan 
erroneously refers to this service mark as "Ohio Casualty Group" in its Original Complaint, and in its opening brief 
on appeal. 
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Tan's failure to name the real party in interest in the Original Complaint was not a technical 
mistake or "misnomer," and because The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company has no "identity of 
interest" with "Ohio Casualty Group;" and (d) Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
does not apply. 
Following the trial court's dismissal of The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, Tan 
continued to litigate the case with John Henry Smith Insurance Company. Ultimately, Tan and 
John Henry Smith Insurance Company reached a settlement agreement. On January 6, 2006, the 
trial court entered Tan's Stipulation of Dismissal releasing John Henry Smith Insurance 
Company per the terms of the settlement agreement. On February 8, 2006, Tan filed its notice of 
appeal from the trial court's order dismissing Tan's claims against The Ohio Casualty Insurance 
Company. 
C. Facts Relevant to the Issues on Appeal 
1. The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company is an Ohio insurance company providing 
coverage for certain risks in Utah and elsewhere. The Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance 
Companies is a registered service mark that The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, along with 
five other insurance companies, is authorized to use in advertising. 
2. The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company issued to Tan a Commercial Package 
Policy, policy number BKA (01) 52 80 63 33. Certified Copy of Commercial Package Policy 
BKA (01) 52 80 63 63, R. 148-254. 
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3. Following the December 11, 2000, theft of 3,580 scooters, Tan made a claim on 
the policy for coverage and benefits in the amount of $134,015.78. The claim was denied 
because the location where the scooters were stored at the time of the theft is not a covered 
location under the policy. 
4. On December 10, 2003, one day prior to the expiration of the three-year statute 
of limitations, Tan filed a lawsuit against John Henry Smith Insurance Company and "Ohio 
Casualty Group" alleging negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and equitable estoppel, and seeking $134,015.78 in 
wholesale losses as a result of the theft of the scooters, general damages, punitive damages, pre-
and post-judgment interest, and attorney fees and costs. Original Complaint, R. 1-8. 
5. In response, on January 5, 2004, The Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance 
Companies filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that "Ohio Casualty Group" is a service mark 
that has no legal identity, and that cannot sue or be sued. The Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance 
Companies' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, R. 20-34 
6. Thereafter, on January 23, 2004, Tan filed an Amended Complaint, alleging the 
same causes of action against John Henry Smith Insurance Company and The Ohio Casualty 
Insurance Company. The Amended Complaint was, however, filed after the three-year statute of 
limitations had run. Amended Complaint, R. 47-54. 
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7. In March 2004, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company filed a motion to dismiss 
on grounds that Tan's Amended Complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had expired 
and that Tan's Amended Complaint did not relate back to Tan's Original Complaint. 
8. Following full briefing and oral argument on the motion to dismiss, the trial court 
issued a September 7, 2004, Memorandum Decision granting the motion to dismiss. 
Memorandum Decision, R. 365-370. 
9. The trial court entered an order of dismissal on October 18, 2004. Order of 
Dismissal, R. 371-374. 
10. The trial court dismissed Tan's case on the following grounds: (a) Tan's Original 
Complaint failed to name the real party of interest, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, and 
instead, improperly named "Ohio Casualty Group," a service mark that can neither sue, nor be 
sued; (b) the statute of limitations on Tan's claims expired one day after the Original Complaint 
was filed; (c) Tan's Amended Complaint naming The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company did not 
relate back to the Original Complaint because Tan did not make a mere technical mistake in 
suing "Ohio Casualty Group," and because The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company does not 
have an "identity of interest" for purposes of relation back under Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and (d) Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply in this 
case. Memorandum Decision at 1-5, R. 365-370. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly dismissed Tan's case against The Ohio Casualty Insurance 
Company. Tan's Amended Complaint, which named the real party in interest, The Ohio 
Casualty Insurance Company, was filed after the running of the applicable three-year statute of 
limitations. Furthermore, Tan's Amended Complaint does not relate back to the Original 
Complaint, which was filed one day prior to the expiration of the limitations period, and which 
improperly named the service mark "Ohio Casualty Group." The Amended Complaint does not 
relate back to the Original Complaint under Rule 15(c), or any other provision of law, because 
Tan purposefully sued "Ohio Casualty Group" and did not merely commit a technical error or 
"misnomer" in naming "Ohio Casualty Group." Furthermore, The Ohio Casualty Insurance 
Company does not have an "identity of interest" with "Ohio Casualty Group" that would allow 
relation back to the Original Complaint. The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company is a business 
entity authorized to sell insurance in Utah, whereas "Ohio Casualty Group" is merely a service 
mark that cannot sue or be sued. Finally, because "Ohio Casualty Group" has no legal identity, it 
cannot be associated with or transacting business with The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 
such that Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure would apply. Therefore, for purposes 
of Rule 17(d), naming "Ohio Casualty Group" does not have the same legal effect as naming the 
real party in interests, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Accordingly, the trial court did 
not err in granting The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company's motion to dismiss and in entering an 
order of dismissal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED TAN'S CASE BECAUSE THE 
AMENDED COMPLAINT, WHICH NAMED THE OHIO CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, WAS BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS AND DID NOT RELATE BACK TO THE ORIGINAL 
COMPLAINT NAMING "OHIO CASUALTY GROUP." 
The trial court did not err in dismissing Tan's case because Tan failed to sue The Ohio 
Casualty Insurance Company prior to the running of the statute of limitations and Tan's 
Amended Complaint did not relate back to the Original Complaint, which named "Ohio Casualty 
Group," filed prior to the expiration of the limitations period. 
In Utah, Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and cases interpreting that rule, 
govern relation back after the statute of limitations has run. Where a plaintiff has, like Tan, sued 
a party other than the real party of interest and allowed the statute of limitations to run before 
amending the complaint to name the real party in interest, Utah courts allow relation back in two 
circumstances: (a) where there has been a technical error or "misnomer," and (b) where the real 
party in interest has an "identity of interest" with the erroneously named party. Penrose v. Ross, 
71 P.3d 631, 634 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); see also Porter v. Fox, 101 P.3d 371, 380, n.9 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2004) (noting that both "misnomer" cases, as well as "identity of interest" cases are both 
"analyzed under rule 15(c)"). 
As will be shown, this case does not present a case of "misnomer" or technical error, and 
there is no "identity of interest" between the real party in interest, The Ohio Casualty Insurance 
Company, and the improperly named service mark "Ohio Casualty Group." Therefore, under 
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Utah law, Tan's Amended Complaint cannot relate back to the Original Complaint and the trial 
court's dismissal of Tan's case should be affirmed. 
A. Tan's Identification Of "Ohio Casualty Group" In The Original Complaint 
Does Not Constitute A Misnomer Or Technical Error Under Utah Law, And 
Therefore, Tan's Amended Complaint Does Not Relate Back To The 
Original Complaint 
Tan's attempts to relate the Amended Complaint back to the Original Complaint fail 
because Tan did not commit a technical error. To the contrary, Tan purposefully named "Ohio 
Casualty Group" in its Original Complaint. Tan's attempts to categorize this matter as just 
another case of "misnomer" are not well-taken and should be rejected. 
"In the misnomer cases, Utah [courts] have permitted amendments where the [original] 
complaint contains a technical defect in the naming or identification of the party." Penrose v. 
Ross, 71 P.3d 631, 634 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). A technical defect occurs where the case caption 
of the original complaint incorrectly identifies the party, but where the correct party is identified 
in the body or text of the original complaint. Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999). 
In Sulzen, the plaintiff improperly named the parents of minors who negligently caused 
the death of a fellow hiker, but properly identified the minors in the body and text of the 
complaint. Id. The Sulzen Court held that under those circumstances, the error was merely 
technical and relation back was proper. Id. In this case, Tan not only named "Ohio Casualty 
Group" in the caption of the Original Complaint, but also continued to refer to "Ohio Casualty 
Group" throughout the text of the Original Complaint, never once making mention of "The Ohio 
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Casualty Insurance Company," the real party in interest. Original Complaint at 2-4, R. 1-9. 
Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Sulzen, Tan did not make a technical error by naming "Ohio 
Casualty Group." To the contrary, Tan purposefully sued "Ohio Casualty Group" and this Court 
should uphold the trial court's determination that Tan's Amended Complaint does not relate back 
to the Original Complaint. 
Additionally, failure to name the correct party is not considered a mere technical defect 
where the Plaintiff has notice of the identity of the real party in interest, but purposefully sues the 
incorrect party. Penrose, 71 P.3d 634-35. In Penrose, the plaintiff improperly named the father 
of the negligent driver. Id at 633-34. The Penrose Court held that naming the father was not a 
technical defect that would allow relation back where the plaintiff knew from the police report 
that the negligent driver was the son and failed to name him. LI at 635. Like the plaintiff in 
Penrose, Tan had notice that the policy was issue by The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. On 
the first page of the insurance policy issued to Tan it is clearly stated: 
INSURANCE IS PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY DESIGNATED BELOW 
(A stock insurance company, herein called the company) 
THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 
Certified Copy of Commercial Package Policy BKA (01) 52 80 63 63, R. 148-254. 
Moreover, the following language appears at the top of the Policy Declarations, pages 2 through 
8 of the insurance policy: 
NAME OF COMPANY THE OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 
IdLR. 149-155. 
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Notwithstanding this notice, Tan purposefully sued "Ohio Casualty Group," not The 
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Just as the police report in Penrose put plaintiff on notice of 
negligent party's identity, the text of the insurance policy clearly and repeatedly provided Tan 
with notice that the insurance policy was issued by The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. 
Therefore, Tan did not make a technical error in naming "Ohio Casualty Group" where Tan was 
on notice that the real party in interest was The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. 
Tan asserts that "[t]he controlling 'misnomer' case in Utah" is Wilcox v. Geneva Rock 
Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1996). Appellant's Brief at 7. Tan attempts to establish that "the 
Wilcox case is exactly the same" as the case at bar by setting up a side-by-side comparison of the 
facts of the present case and the facts in Wilcox. Id. Tan fails, however, to account for one key 
distinguishing fact. In Wilcox, "[t]he complaint incorrectly named as defendant 'Geneva Rock 
Corporation, a Utah Corporation,' rather than 'Geneva Rock Products, Inc, a Utah Corporation.' 
However, a summons that correctly named Geneva and a copy of the complaint were served . . . 
on Geneva Rock Products, Inc." Id. at 368 (emphasis added). In the present case neither the 
summons nor the Original Complaint contained any reference to The Ohio Casualty Insurance 
Company. Instead, both the summons and the Original Complaint improperly named the service 
mark, "Ohio Casualty Group." This fact alone renders Tan's arguments based on Wilcox 
inapplicable to this matter. Furthermore, Penrose was decided seven years after Wilcox. 
Penrose disallows a plaintiff, who has notice of the identity of the real party in interest, from 
naming the wrong party, allowing the statute of limitations to run, and then attempting to relate 
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an amended complaint back. Penrose, 71 P.3d at 635. As discussed above, Tan had notice that 
the real party in interest in this case was The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Thus, the trial 
court properly relied upon the analysis contained in Penrose and found that Tan's Amended 
Complaint could not relate back to the Original Complaint. 
In light of the foregoing, this case is not a "misnomer" case or a case involving a mere 
technical error. Tan purposefully sued "Ohio Casualty Group." Accordingly, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's ruling that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint does not relate back to the 
Original Complaint due to technical error. 
B. The Service Mark "Ohio Casualty Group" Is Not A Legal Entity, Does Not 
Have A Legal Identity, Cannot And Does Not Have An Identity of Interest 
With The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, And Therefore, Tan's 
Amended Complaint Does Not Relate Back To The Original Complaint 
Tan asserts in his opening brief that the trial court erred in relying on the "identity of 
interest" analysis because "[t]he 'identity of interest' test is used when new parties are 
substituted or added" and because in this case "[tjhere has only been one party before the court." 
Appellant's Brief at 11. In fact, "Ohio Casualty Group" is separate and distinct from The Ohio 
Casualty Insurance Company. As was pointed out both in briefing and oral argument to the trial 
court, "Ohio Casualty Group" is a service mark—the service equivalent of a trademark—and 
therefore cannot sue, cannot be sued, and cannot have an identity of interest with anyone, 
including The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, or any of the other insurance companies 
authorized to use the service mark. Tan also asserts in its opening brief, both in the Summary of 
Argument section, and elsewhere, that "Ohio Casualty Group" is a "doing business as" or "dba" 
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of The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, and is, therefore, one in the same. Appellant's Brief 
at 4,11-13. This assertion is legally incorrect and misleading. The proper description of the 
service mark "Ohio Casualty Group" is found in 15 USCA § 1127 (2006), which defines certain 
federal trademark terms of art: 
The term "service mark" means any word, name, symbol or 
device, or any combination thereof— 
(1) used by a person, or 
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in 
commerce and applies to register on the principle register 
established by this Act, 
to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a 
unique service, from the services of others 
15 USCA §1127. 
A recent federal district court decision in the Tenth Circuit confirms that "a service mark 
. . . is not a legal entity capable of being sued." Bishop v. Long Term Disability Income Plan of 
SAP America, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19510 at *2, n.l (N.D. Okla., Mar. 2, 2006); see also 
Country Rock Cafe, Inc., v. Truck Insur. Exch. and Farmers Insur. Group., 417 F.Supp.2d 399, 
401-402 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that "Farmers Insurance Group" was a registered service 
mark, not a legal entity, and therefore, could not be sued); Danna v. CNA Insur. Co., 1996 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 5048, at *2, n.2 (E.D. La., April 11,1996) ("a service mark registered with the 
United States Patent and Trademark Agency . . . is not a legal entity . . . [and is] therefore an 
improper party to this lawsuit"). Thus, a service mark such as "Ohio Casualty Group" is not a 
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"dba" as Tan asserts. It is simply a logo that a select group of insurance companies have been 
authorized to use in advertising. As a service mark, "Ohio Casualty Group" is not a legal entity 
and can never be a proper party in any lawsuit. Accordingly, Tan's assertion that the trial court 
improperly employed the "identity of interest" analysis because the case at bar only involves a 
single party is simply wrong. 
The trial court did not err in employing the "identity of interest" test. Furthermore, after 
applying the test, the trial court properly determined that "Ohio Casualty Group" does not have 
an identity of interest with The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, and therefore, that Tan's 
Amended Complaint does not relate back to the Original Complaint by operation of Rule 15(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Over the years, Utah appellate courts have had several opportunities to address the issue 
of "identity of interest" for purposes of relation back under Rule 15(c). In one of the earliest 
cases, Attorney General v. Pomerov, 73 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1937), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that an identity of interest exists where "the determination of the issues as to any defendant 
depends on or affects the determination of the issues as to the other defendants." IdL at 1294. 
Similarly, in Nunez v. Albo, 53 P.3d 2 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), the Utah Court of Appeals 
determined that an identity of interest existed where the legal positions of the parties were the 
same. Finally, in Penrose, the Court held that there is no identity of interest where "a disposition 
as to either party does not affect the claims or defenses available to the other party . . . [and] 
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where [the parties] do not have the "same legal interest" in the outcome of the case. Penrose, 71 
P.3d at 636 (emphasis added). 
Tan does not and cannot establish that an identity of interest exists in this case under the 
analyses of Pomeroy, Nunez, or Penrose. First, a disposition of the case against "Ohio Casualty 
Group" would have no legal effect of any kind on The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. 
Therefore, under Penrose, there is no identity of interest. Next, the positions and defenses of 
"Ohio Casualty Group" against Tan's claims are not the same, or even similar, to those of The 
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. "Ohio Casualty Group's" defense in this matter is that it is a 
service mark that is a non-entity, without assets, unable to sue, and unable to be sued under any 
circumstance. On the other hand, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company's defense is that it did 
not act negligently or improperly, and that even if it did, Tan's Amended Complaint against The 
Ohio Casualty Insurance Company was filed after the statute of limitations had run. 
Accordingly, a determination of the rights and defenses of "Ohio Casualty Group" in this matter 
would not affect the rights or defenses of The Ohio Casualty Insurance in any way, and visa 
versa. Therefore, under Pomerov and Nunez there is no identity of interest in this case that 
would allow for relation back. 
In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme 
Court faced a slightly different question involving the "identity of interest" test for purposes of 
relation back. There, the Court found that an identity of interest exists if "the parties are so 
closely related in their business operations that notice of the action against one serves to provide 
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notice of the action to the other. Such an identity exists, for example, between past and present 
forms of the same enterprise." Id. at 217. Furthermore, "privity of contract... is an insufficient 
identity of interest for the purpose of [relation back] under Rule 15(c). Id. Under Perry, there is 
not an identity of interest between "Ohio Casualty Group" and The Ohio Casualty Insurance 
Company. First, "Ohio Casualty Group" is a service mark that cannot be a "party" in any sense 
of the word. Next, as a mere service mark, "Ohio Casualty Group" is not engaged in any 
"business operations" of any kind, and therefore cannot be said to have "business operations" 
related to the business operations of The Ohio Casualty Insurance Group, which is in the 
business of selling insurance contracts in the State of Utah and elsewhere. Finally, The Ohio 
Casualty Insurance Company is not in privity of contract with "Ohio Casualty Group" for 
purposes of this case, and even if it was, privity alone is insufficient to establish an "identity of 
interest." Thus, Tan cannot establish an identity of interest in this case based on Perry. 
Finally, Tan claims in its opening brief that "[t]he trial court's approach was rejected in 
Porter v. Fox." Appellant's Brief at 10 (citing Porter v. Fox, 101 P.3d 371 (Utah Ct. App. 
2004)). Tan appears to believe that the Porter case somehow overruled Penrose. To the 
contrary, when Penrose is Shepardized, it is clear that Porter did not overrule Penrose. In fact, 
Porter only cites Penrose once in the context of the proper standard of review to apply in cases 
where the statute of limitations has run and a plaintiff attempts to relate back a subsequently filed 
amended complaint to the original complaint filed prior to the running of the limitations period. 
Porter, 101 P.3d at 379. Ultimately, Porter affirms that the "identity of interest" test is good law 
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in Utah. As Tan concedes in its opening brief, "[i]n Porter, the question was whether a 
construction surety had a sufficient 'identity of interest' with the contractor that it insured." 
Appellant's Brief at 11. Thus, Utah courts are to apply the "identity of interest" test in cases 
where a plaintiff has failed to sue the real party interest prior to the running of the statute of 
limitations and then later attempts, as Tan does here, to relate an amended complaint back to the 
original complaint to save the plaintiffs claims from operation of the statute of limitations. Id at 
381. Because Tan has not and cannot establish that The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company has 
an identity of interest with the service mark "Ohio Casualty Group," the trial court properly 
found that Tan's Amended Complaint did not related back to the Original Complaint. This Court 
should affirm the trial court and uphold the order of dismissal of Tan's case. 
II. THIS CASE IS NOT PROPERLY ANALYZED UNDER RULE 17(d) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND THEREFORE, THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DISMISSAL OF TAN'S CASE WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE 
UPHELD. 
Alternatively, Tan argues that it properly named The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company 
in the Original Complaint when it named "Ohio Casualty Group" because, under Rule 17(d) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company was "associated in 
. . . business with" "Ohio Casualty Group" such that suing the one is as good as suing the other. 
Tan's assertion is without merit. 
Under Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by a common name. When 
two or more persons associated in any business either as a joint-
stock company, a partnership or other association, not a 
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corporation, transact such business under a common name, 
whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they 
may sue or be sued by such common name. Any judgment 
obtained against the association shall bind the joint property of all 
the associates in the same manner as if all had been named parties 
and had been sued upon their joint liability. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(d). 
Directly stated, this rule does not apply to the case at bar. As has been explained in great 
detail above, "Ohio Casualty Group" is a service mark. The service mark "Ohio Casualty 
Group" has no legal identity. It is not a "person" in any sense of the word. It is not a "business" 
in any sense of the word. It is not a "dba" of The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. It has no 
assets or "property." It cannot enter into partnerships or other associations of any kind with an 
actual business entity. It cannot sue or be sued. Because it cannot be sued, no judgment of any 
kind may be obtained against it in any court of law. Therefore, it is impossible for a judgment 
against "Ohio Casualty Group" to bind The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. 
In short, Rule 17(d) does not and cannot apply to this case. Accordingly, the trial court 
properly dismissed Tan's case and this Court should affirm that result. 
18 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the trial court and uphold the trial court's dismissal of Tan's case. 
DATED this 21st day of July, 2006. 
BERRETT & ASSOCIATES, L.C. 
Barbate KMterret 
Nathan C. Croxford 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
The Ohio Casualty Insurance Company 
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United States District Court,N.D. Oklahoma. 
Kurt Anthony BISHOP, Plaintiff, 
v. 
LONG TERM DISABILITY INCOME PLAN OF 
SAP AMERICA, INC., an Erisa qualified plan 
administered by SAP American, Inc., Life Insurance 
Company of North America, and Cigna, Defendants. 
No. 04-CV-0031-CVE-SAJ. 
March 2, 2006. 
Jessica Eileen Rainey, Ray Thompson Hillis, Titus 
Hillis Reynolds Love Dickman & McCalmon, 
Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff. 
Anthony L. Gallia, Matthew A. Taylor, Duane 
Morris LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Donald Mitchell 
Bingham, James Ronald Polan, Riggs Abney Neal 
Turpen Orbison & Lewis, Tulsa, OK, for 
Defendants. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
EAGAN, Chief J. 
*1 Plaintiff filed this action to recover benefits and 
enforce his rights under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1101 et 
seq. ("ERISA"). Plaintiff challenges the decision by 
The Life Insurance Company of North America (" 
LIN A") to terminate his long-term disability ("LTD" 
) benefits under the Long Term Disability Income 
Plan of SAP America, Inc. (the "Plan") .FN1 
FN1. Defendants ask the Court to dismiss 
CIGNA as a named defendant. Dkt. # 27, 
at 4 n. 1. LINA asserts that CIGNA is 
merely a service mark used by LINA and 
is not a legal entity capable of being sued. 
Id; see Adm. Rec. at 215. Without 
objection, the Court dismisses CIGNA as a 
party in this action. 
Page 1 
L 
Plaintiff was hired by SAP America, Inc. ("SAP") 
in 1994 as a technology consultant. According to 
SAP, the essential duties of technology consultant 
included providing technical expertise, database 
administration, paperwork, and "extensive travel." 
Administrative Record ("Adm.Rec") at 220-23. 
This job description is an internal SAP document 
independent from the Plan. Id at 223. In contrast to 
the SAP description, the Department of Labor's 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") rates 
the position of technology consultant as sedentary 
and does not include the travel requirement. Id. at 
349. In January 2001, SAP accommodated 
plaintiffs medical conditions by permitting him to 
work as a technology consultant without requiring 
him to travel. See id. at 172, 225. Due to corporate 
restructuring, SAP eliminated plaintiffs position in 
June 2001 and plaintiff was terminated from payroll 
effective January 1, 2002. Id at 219, 305. Plaintiffs 
annual salary had been approximately $85,000. 
Adm. Rec. at 117. 
As an eligible SAP employee, plaintiff became a 
participant in the Plan, which provides short term 
disability ("STD") and LTD benefits to qualified 
participants. Id. at 8-36. As an active full-time 
employee earning more than $60,000, plaintiff was 
classified as a Group 1 Plan participant. Id. at 14. 
SAP designated LINA as the independent claims 
administrator of the Plan. Id. at Supp.l. LINA is a 
multi-million dollar corporation which operates 
under the CIGNA service mark and issues insurance 
plans nationwide. LINA is both the claims 
administrator and the insurer of the Plan. Id. The 
Plan grants LINA discretion "to interpret the terms 
of the Plan documents, to decide questions of 
eligibility for coverage or benefits under the Plan, 
and to make any related findings of fact." Adm. 
Rec. at Supp.l. 
Plaintiff filed a claim for STD benefits in July 2001. 
Id. at 126-27. Plaintiffs medical records indicate 
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that plaintiff suffered from pulmonary disease, 
chronic asthma, allergies, osteoporosis, intestinal 
problems, depression, hypertension, migraine 
headaches, and chronic back pain. Id. at 172-74. 
LINA assigned Daniel A. Nackley, M.D., to review 
plaintiffs file. Id. Dr. Nackley concluded: 
It is anticipated that should he have a sedentary job 
with which he did not have to perform any 
significant degree of ambulation, lifting, or 
carrying, he could perform adequately. However, it 
is expected that his condition will worsen such that 
the combination of his impairments would affect his 
functionality with regard to any type of work. 
*2 Lastly, the medical on file documents an 
impairment such that his ability to travel for his 
work would be affected in a significant fashion. 
Id. at 174. Based on Dr. Nackley's review, LINA 
approved plaintiffs STD claim on October 25, 
2001. Adm. Rec. at 175. It renewed his STD 
benefits on December 27, 2001. Id. at 185. 
Plaintiffs STD benefits bridged over into LTD 
benefits as of February 21, 2002. Id. at 249. In 
March 2002, the Social Security Administration (" 
SSA") denied plaintiffs application for disability 
benefits, finding that a[b]ased on your description 
of the work you performed as a consultant for 
several years, evidence indicates that you are 
capable of doing this type of work." Id. at 301-04. 
In August 2002, plaintiffs primary physician, 
Kenneth W. Piper, M.D., submitted a physical 
abilities assessment ("PAA") form. Id. at 291-92. 
The PAA asks a physician to identify his or her 
patient's level of physical work function for an eight 
hour workday. Dr. Piper indicated that plaintiff was 
capable of "sedentary" activities as of August 2002. 
Adm. Rec. at 291-92. 
In August 2003, LINA requested supplemental 
medical records from plaintiff. In response, Dr. 
Piper submitted medical notes regarding 
improvements in plaintiffs health, such as "superb" 
blood pressure. Id. at 332-33. Dr. Piper wrote that " 
we are clearly moving away from a state of severe 
chronic asthma into much improved status" and " 
everything is going well." Id. In September 2003, 
Dr. Piper submitted a PAA wherein he identified 
plaintiff as capable of "light" physical work, which 
is one step above "sedentary." Id. at 339-40. On this 
2003 PAA, Dr. Piper noted that plaintiff was 
capable of: 
Sitting: continuously (i.e., 5.5 + hours out of 8); 
Standing: frequently (2.5-5 hours out of 8); 
Walking: occasionally (less than 2.5 hours out of 8); 
Balancing: occasionally (less than 2.5 hours out of 
8); 
Kneeling: occasionally (less than 2.5 hours out of 8); 
Hearing: continuously (i.e., 5.5 + hours out of 8); 
Reaching: occasionally (less than 2.5 hours out of 
8); 
Seeing: continuously (i.e., 5.5 + hours out of 8); 
Smelling/tasting: continuously (i.e., 5.5 + hours out 
of 8); 
Use of lower extremities: frequently (2.5-5 hours 
out of 8); 
Exposure to vibration: frequently (2.5-5 hours out 
of 8); 
Can work around machinery: frequently (2.5-5 
hours out of 8). 
Id. In addition, LINA asked Dr. Piper directly 
whether plaintiff was "able to use fine manipulation 
at desk level" and he responded "Yes." Adm. Rec. 
at 342. Based on these medical records, LINA 
determined that plaintiff was not "totally disabled" 
under the Plan and terminated plaintiffs LTD 
benefits on September 25, 2003. Id. at 345-47. 
Plaintiff immediately appealed. Id. at 351-52. 
For Group 1 employees, the Plan defines "Total 
Disability" as follows: 
An Employee will be considered Totally Disabled 
if, because of Injury or Sickness, he is unable to 
perform all the essential duties of his occupation. 
*3 Id. at 11. The parties dispute the definition of " 
his occupation" and whether plaintiff qualifies as " 
totally disabled." Plaintiff argues that "his 
occupation" requires him to travel, while defendants 
classify plaintiffs occupation as sedentary. LINA 
interprets these terms of the Plan based on the DOT 
definition and SAP's accommodation which waived 
plaintiffs travel requirement. 
Upon appeal, plaintiff failed to provide medical 
documentation requested by LINA. In its notice of 
termination, LINA advised plaintiff to provide any 
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and all medical documentation that he felt 
supported his LTD claim, including "Medical 
Office notes from January, 2003 through present [,] 
Objective test results such as MRIs, x-rays, etc 
[and a] narrative from your physician outlining your 
level of functioning and explaining how your 
present condition limits you from your job duties " 
Id at 346-47 This notice also informed plaintiff of 
his rights under ERISA Adm Rec at 347 At this 
stage, the only documentation plaintiff submitted 
was a letter from Dr Piper statmg that "[although 
[Bishop's] physical work level would theoretically 
allow him to perform some sedentary or light work, 
I am not clearing him to return him to the 
workplace In my opinion, his complex medical 
problems would deteriorate rapidly if he were 
forced to attempt even sedentary activities " Id at 
353 In this letter, Dr Piper confirmed that he 
authored the 2003 PAA, which designated plaintiff 
as capable of light work Id Dr Piper did not 
submit an amended or corrected PAA despite 
LINA's instruction Citmg Dr Piper's confirmation 
of the 2003 PAA and the lack of any medical 
evidence to support the physician's speculation on 
the possibility of future deterioration, LINA upheld 
the termination of plaintiffs LTD benefits on 
December 11,2003 Id at 362-63 
II 
On January 14, 2004, plaintiff filed suit, alleging 
that defendants violated 29 U S C § 1132 in 
terminating his LTD benefits As a plan beneficiary, 
plaintiff has the right to federal court review of 
benefit denials and terminations under ERISA " 
ERISA was enacted to promote the interests of 
employees and their beneficiaries in employee 
benefit plans, and to protect contractually defined 
benefits " Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v Bruch, 
489 US 101, 113, 109 S Ct 948, 103 LEd2d 80 
(1989) Specifically, section 1132(a)(1)(B) grants 
plaintiff the right "to recover benefits due to him 
under the terms of the plan, to enforce his rights 
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to 
future benefits under the terms of the plan" A 
termination of benefits challenged under section 
1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under an arbitrary 
and capricious standard when a plan gives the 
© 2006 ThomsonAVest No 
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claims administrator discretionary authority to 
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the 
terms of a plan See Firestone, 489 US at 115 The 
parties do not dispute that the Plan gave LINA such 
discretionary authonty 
*4 The issue, then, is whether LINA acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously when it made the final 
decision to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits on 
December 11, 2003 Under the two-tier "sliding 
scale" approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit, an " 
additional reduction in deference is appropriate" 
where there is an inherent or proven conflict of 
interest Fought v Unum Life Ins Co of America, 
379 F3d 997, 1006 (10th Cir2004) It is 
undisputed that LINA has an inherent conflict of 
interest as it is both payor and administrator of the 
Plan As such, there is a reduction in deference to 
the administrator's decision and LINA bears the 
burden of proving "that its interpretation of the 
terms of the plan is reasonable and that its 
application of those terms to the claimant is 
supported by substantial evidence " Id 
The determinative inquiry m this case is whether 
LINA's decision was supported by substantial 
evidence " 'Substantial evidence is such evidence 
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support the conclusion reached by the 
[decisionmaker]' Substantial evidence requires ' 
more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance " 
' Sandoval v Aetna Life and Cas Inc Co, 967 
F2d 377, 382 (10th Cir 1992) (internal citations 
omitted) "Evidence is not substantial 'if it is 
overwhelmed by other evidence-particularly certain 
types of evidence {eg, that offered by treating 
physicians), or if it really constitutes not evidence 
but mere conclusion " ' Knipe v Heckler, 755 F 2d 
141, 145 (10th Cirl985) (citation omitted) 
Medical information offered by a Plan participant's 
primary physician is to be considered, but it is not 
entitled to special deference Black & Decker 
Disability Plan v Nord, 538 U S 822, 832, 123 
S Ct 1965, 155 L Ed 2d 1034 (2003) 
The Court gives less deference to an administrator's 
conclusions if the administrator fails to gather or 
examine relevant evidence See Caldwell v Life Ins 
Co of North America, 287 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th 
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Cir 2002), Kimber v Thiokol Corp, 196 F 3d 1092, 
1097 (10th Cirl999) The Court considers the 
record as a whole, but the Court considers only that 
information available to the plan administrator at 
the time the decision was made Hall v Unum Life 
Ins Co of Am, 300 F 3d 1197, 1201 (10th 
Cir 2002) An administrator's decision "need not be 
the only logical one nor even the best one," 
Woolsey v Marion Labs, Inc, 934 F 2d 1452, 
1460 (10th Cir 1991) 
HL 
ERISA was enacted to protect contractual rights 
and, consequently, the terms of the Plan dictate See 
Firestone, 489 US at 113 LINA has discretionary 
authority to interpret the terms of the Plan LINA's 
interpretation of "his occupation" of technology 
consultant to be sedentary is reasonable To support 
their interpretation of Plan terminology, LINA cites 
the DOT definition of "technology consultant" 
which omits any travel requirement See Gallagher 
v Reliance Standard Life Ins Co, 305 F 3d 264, 
271 (4th Cir 2002) (where the "only significant 
discrepancy between the job description adopted by 
[defendant] and [employer's] description of 
[plaintiffs] actual job is the failure of the former to 
include the travel requirement," defendant's 
adoption of the DOT definition was reasonable) 
Further, at the time plaintiff filed his initial 
disability benefits claim, his job did not require him 
to travel Given the sedentary nature of plaintiffs 
occupation, LINA acted reasonably in terminating 
his LTD benefits after receiving confirmation that 
plaintiff was capable of light work, which is a 
higher level of ability than sedentary 
*5 Physician reports m 2002 and 2003 classify 
plaintiff as capable of working at a sedentary work 
level or greater In Fall 2003, Dr Piper submitted 
evidence of plaintiffs improved physical status, 
plaintiffs ability to perform more than sedentary 
activities, and plaintiffs ability to use fine 
manipulation at desk level At this time, LINA was 
aware that SSA had demed plaintiffs disability 
claim The SSA uses an "any occupation" standard 
rather than a "his occupation" standard adopted by 
the Plan Therefore, SSA's denial of plaintiff s claim 
© 2006 ThomsonAVest No 
for disability benefits may be persuasive, but it is 
not determinative See Pack v Michehn Retirement 
Plan, 229 F 3d 1164 (10th Cir 2000) ("There is no 
evidence that [defendant] placed any conclusive or 
otherwise undue reliance on this particular [SSA] 
report, or that its consideration of this report 
rendered its denial of benefits arbitrary and 
capncious ") 
On appeal, LINA asked both plaintiff and his 
primary physician to submit medical evidence to 
support plaintiffs qualification for LTD benefits 
under the Plan However, plaintiff failed to produce 
evidence that he was "unable to perform all the 
essential duties of his occupation" LINA 
specifically requested objective test results, but 
plaintiff failed to deliver The only "evidence" 
plaintiff submitted was Dr Piper's subjective letter 
on appeal which opined that he would not release 
plaintiff to work Dr Piper's opinions that he would 
not personally elease plaintiff to return to work is 
irrelevant to the issue of whether plaintiff met the 
Plan's definition of "totally disabled" The Plan 
does not reference a physician's release to return to 
work but rather focuses on ability to conduct work 
activities Evidence of plaintiffs capacity to 
perform in "his occupation" was substantial 
Therefore, LINA acted reasonably in terminating 
plaintiffs LTD benefits 
IV 
In summary, defendants' decision to terminate 
plaintiffs LTD benefits is an exercise of the 
discretion granted by the Plan Viewing the record 
as a whole, LINA relied upon substantial evidence 
to interpret the terms of the Plan and to conclude 
that plaintiff did not meet the Plan's definition of " 
totally disabled" The Court finds that defendants' 
decision to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits was 
not arbitrary and capncious This finding is based 
on the medical evidence submitted to and reviewed 
by LINA and does not rely upon the SSA 
determination 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' 
December 11, 2003 final decision to terminate 
plaintiffs LTD benefits is hereby AFFIRMED A 
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separate judgment is filed herewith. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that CIGNA is 
dismissed as a party to this action as it is a service 
mark and not a legal entity capable of suing or 
being sued. 
N.D.Okla.,2006. 
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United States District Court,S.D. New York. 
COUNTRY ROCK CAFE, INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE and Farmers 
Insurance Group, Defendants. 
No. 05 Civ. 8924(WCC). 
Feb. 22, 2006. 
Background: Insured brought action to recover 
under commercial general liability policy after a fire 
damaged its property. Defendants moved to dismiss. 
Holdings: The District Court, William C. Conner, 
Senior District Judge, held that: 
1(1) "Farmers Insurance Group," a service mark 
used by corporation that provided insurance 
management services to various member insurers, 
was not an entity capable of being sued, and 
4(2) insurer, as reciprocal or interinsurance 
exchange organized under California's 
Interinsurance Law, was a citizen of New York for 
purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 
Motion granted. 
West Headnotes 
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"Farmers Insurance Group" service mark used by 
corporation that provided insurance management 
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entity capable of being sued. 
[2] Federal Courts 170B €==>34 
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170BI(A) In General 
170Bk29 Objections to Jurisdiction, 
Determination and Waiver 
170Bk34 k. Presumptions and Burden 
of Proof Most Cited Cases 
Jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively, and that 
showing is not made by drawing from the pleadings 
inferences favorable to the party asserting it. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(1), 28 U.S.C.A. 
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Unincorporated association, for diversity purposes, 
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supplemental jurisdiction, a district court has 
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Trademarks 382T €^1800 
382T Trademarks 
382TXI Trademarks and Trade Names 
Adjudicated 
382Tkl800 k. Alphabetical Listing. Most 
Cited Cases 
Farmers Insurance Group. 
*400 Edward H. Odesser, LLC (Gary J. Langer, 
Edward H. Odesser, of counsel), White Plains, NY, 
for Plaintiff. 
Lustig & Brown, LLP (Sherri N. Pavloff, of 
counsel), New York City, for Defendants. 
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OPINION AND ORDER 
WILLIAM C. CONNER, Senior District Judge. 
Plaintiff Country Rock Cafe, Inc. brings this action 
seeking relief for breach of contract and requesting 
a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against 
defendants Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE") and 
Farmers Insurance Group ("Farmers") (collectively, 
"defendants"), based on an insurance policy issued 
by defendants to plaintiff. Plaintiff commenced 
this action on October 20, 2005, seeking to collect 
under that insurance policy after a fire damaged 
plaintiffs property. This matter is before this Court 
based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332. Defendants now seek to dismiss the action 
on the grounds that: (1) Farmers was improperly 
named as a party; (2) there is no subject matter 
jurisdiction as diversity does not exist between 
plaintiff and TIE; (3) the second cause of action for 
equitable and injunctive relief is invalid; and (4) 
plaintiff cannot prove punitive, exemplary or 
special damages. For the reasons stated herein, 
defendants' motion is granted. 
BACKGROUND 
In March 2004, the parties entered into an insurance 
agreement (the "policy") under which plaintiff 
would make premium payments to defendants in 
exchange for commercial general liability insurance 
coverage. *401 (Complt.^ J 13.) The policy 
provided an aggregate limit of $1 million coverage 
for business and property loss from fire until the 
policy's expiration March 12, 2005. (Id. ffil 14> 
15.) On January 6, 2005, there was a fire at Country 
Rock Cafe, prompting plaintiff to file an insurance 
claim requesting coverage in excess of 
$160,000.00. (Id. Yh 16, 17.) Defendants, on 
February 28, 2005, rejected the claim, stating that 
the policy was not in effect after December 17, 
2004. (Id.^ 18.) 
Plaintiff claims that Christopher O'Brien, an agent 
of Farmers, requested that plaintiff send its 
premium payments to O'Brien's office, and that 
plaintiff subsequently made timely payments. (Id. 
\% 19, 20; Defs. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. 
A.) Plaintiff asserts that it is standard practice to 
furnish payments to an agent of the insurance 
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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carrier, and that this was the pattern of practice 
between the parties (Complt^ 21, 22) 
According to plaintiff, defendants also debited 
plaintiffs account for "reinstatement charges from 
September 27 to December 11, 2004" (Id K 23) 
The total amount debited was $703 76, in addition 
to which premium charges from December 12, 2004 
to January 11, 2005 in the amount of $278 08 were 
also debited (Id) The total amount due to Farmers, 
after credits and charges on another Farmers' policy 
were accounted for, was $489 97 (Id) Plaintiff 
issued a check m that amount made payable to " 
Farmer Ins " on December 2, 2004, this check was 
deposited and cleared (Id ffi[ 24, 25, 26) 
Plaintiff believed that this check "timely tendered 
payment in full for insurance coverage for the time 
penod that includes the subject date of loss " (Id ^ 
24) This check allegedly included an insurance 
premium payment by plaintiff that covered January 
6, 2005-the date of the fire (Id % 27 ) 
DISCUSSION 
L Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(2) 
[1] Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing this 
Court's jurisdiction over defendants See Metro 
Life Ins Co v Robertson-Ceco Corp 84 F 3d 560, 
566 (2d Cir 1996) The nature of the plaintiffs 
obligation, however, "vanes depending on the 
procedural posture of the litigation" Ball v 
Metallurgy Hoboken-Overpelt, SA, 902 F 2d 194, 
197 (2d Cir 1990) Prior to discovery, a motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) may be defeated 
if the plaintiffs complamt and affidavits contam 
sufficient allegations, made in good faith, to 
establish a prima facie showmg of jurisdiction See 
id Moreover, the court must assume the truth of 
the plaintiffs factual allegations See id 
Generally, an entity may be sued in federal court if 
it has the capacity to be sued under the laws of the 
state where it was created See Fed R Civ P 17(b) 
, Rowland v Cal Men's Colony, Unit II Men's 
Advisory Council, 506 US 194, 214, 113 S Ct 
716, 121 L Ed 2d 656 (1993) 
© 2006 ThomsonAVest No 
Defendants claim that "Farmers Insurance Group is 
a federally registered service mark used as a logo 
for marketing purposes," and, therefore, is not an 
entity capable of being sued (Defs Mem Supp 
Mot Dismiss at 4-5) Plaintiff concedes that 
Farmers Insurance Group is a service mark, but 
asserts that defendants cannot establish that it is not 
also a legal entity (PI Mem Opp Mot Dismiss at 
2 ) However, in support of their position defendants 
provide an affidavit from Adam G Morris, 
Assistant Secretary of the attorney-in-fact for TIE, 
as well as documents from the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office and the State of California 
(Defs Mem Supp Mot Dismiss, Exs B, C ) The 
service mark registration form from the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office mdicates that 
Farmers Insurance *402 Group is a service mark 
owned by Farmers Group, Inc (Id, Ex B) In 
addition, a Special Certificate from the State of 
California Department of Insurance and a 
Certificate of Nonfiling Corporation from the 
Secretary of State indicate that Farmers Insurance 
Group is not, nor ever has been, a corporation 
licensed to transact business in California™1 (Id, 
Ex C) 
FN1 As plaintiff indicates, the copies of 
these documents are dated 1996 and 1998 
(Defs Mem Supp Mot Dismiss, Ex C) 
However, there has been nothing produced 
to indicate that the assertions m these 
documents are now false or that Farmers 
Insurance Group has subsequently become 
a company licensed to do business m 
California 
Farmers Group, Inc, a subsidiary of Zurich 
Fmancial Services, a Swiss msurance company, 
operates under the service mark Farmers Insurance 
Group, providing management services to various 
member companies, including TIE 
(www hoovers com (search for "Farmers Insurance 
Group")) Farmers Group, Inc "is a provider of 
msurance management services and a holdmg 
company" that acts as attorney-in-fact for three 
reciprocal msurance exchanges, including TIE 
(www farmers com (follow "About Farmers" 
hyperlink)) As defendants indicate, "industry 
to Ong U S Govt Works 
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publications establish that the 'attorney in fact' [for 
TIE] is 'Farmers Group Inc.' (not to be confused 
with 'Farmers Insurance Group', the service mark 
incorrectly named by plaintiff as a defendant in this 
suit), doing business as 'Truck Underwriters 
Association.' " (Defs. Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. 
Dismiss at 3.) Although Farmers Group Inc. may be 
a proper party to this action, that question is not 
before this Court. As the evidence provided by 
defendants indicates, plaintiff is unable to establish 
a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over Farmers. 
Therefore, Farmers is not a proper party to this 
action. 
II. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(1) 
[2][3][4] When considering a motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(1), a court must "accept as true all material 
factual allegations in the complaint." Shipping Fin. 
Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d 
Cir.1998) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 
236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), 
overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 
U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984)). 
However, "jurisdiction must be shown 
affirmatively, and that showing is not made by 
drawing from the pleadings inferences favorable to 
the party asserting it." Drakos, 140 F.3d at 129 
(citing Norton v. Larney, 266 U.S. 511, 515, 45 
S.Ct. 145, 69 L.Ed. 413 (1925)). When 
determining whether subject matter jurisdiction 
exists, a court may properly refer to evidence 
beyond the pleadings to resolve disputed 
jurisdictional facts. See Makarova v. United States, 
201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000). "Thus, the 
standard used to evaluate a Rule 12(b)(1) claim is 
akin to that for summary judgment under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)." Serrano v. 900 5th Ave. Corp., 
4 F.Supp.2d 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y.1998). Plaintiff 
bears the burden of establishing the court's 
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. 
See Malik v. Meissner, 82 F.3d 560, 562 (2d 
Cir.1996). 
[5] In addition to providing the affidavit of Morris, 
defendants have provided a copy of the report from 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
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Best's Insurance Reports, which indicates that TIE 
is a reciprocal or interinsurance exchange organized 
under California's Interinsurance Law. (Defs. Mem. 
Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A; Defs. Reply Mem. 
Supp. Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A.) Under California's 
Insurance Code, a reciprocal or interinsurance 
exchange *403 permits subscribers to exchange 
contracts and is the "insurer" whereas each 
subscriber is the "insured." Cal. Ins.Code § 1303 
(2005). "The exchange may sue or be sued in its 
own name as in the case of an individual. Any 
judgment rendered against the exchange shall be 
binding upon each subscriber only in such 
proportion as his interests may appear." Cal. 
Ins.Code § 1450 (2005). TIE "is a reciprocal 
insurance exchange composed of a number of 
members acting as an unincorporated association." 
Truck Ins. Exch. v. Dow Chem. Co., 331 F.Supp. 
323, 324 (W.D.Mo.1971). An unincorporated 
association, for diversity purposes, is a citizen of 
each state in which it has members. See United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 
U.S. 145, 146-47, 86 S.Ct. 272, 15 L.Ed.2d 217 
(1965); Baer v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 503 F.2d 
393, 395 (2d Cir. 1974). 
Plaintiff, a New York citizen insured by TIE, is a 
member of TIE. (Complt.^ J 10.) TIE is, therefore, 
a citizen of New York because at least one of its 
members, plaintiff, is a citizen of New York. Since 
TIE, the only remaining defendant, see infra Part I., 
has the same citizenship as plaintiff, there is no 
diversity between the parties. As this Court no 
longer has jurisdiction over this action, we will not 
consider the other issues raised by defendants in 
their motion papers. 
Ill, Remaining State Law Claims 
[6] A district court may decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it "has 
dismissed all claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). When 
determining whether to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction, a district court has "considerable 
discretion over what state law claims it will include 
within its supplemental jurisdiction in a particular 
case." Yaba v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Toft, 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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931 FSupp 271, 275 (SDNY1996) (quoting 
Cushing v Moore, 970 F 2d 1103, 1110 (2d 
Cir 1992)) Accordingly, as all federal claims have 
been dismissed, we exercise our discretion and 
declme to retam supplemental jurisdiction over 
plaintiffs remaining state law breach of contract 
claim 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion of 
defendants Truck Insurance Exchange and Farmers 
Insurance Group is granted, and the action is 
dismissed in its entirety The dismissal is without 
prejudice, except for the claim against Farmers 
Insurance Group, which is dismissed with prejudice 
SO ORDERED 
S D N Y ,2006 
Country Rock Cafe, Inc v Truck Ins Exchange 
417 FSupp 2d 399 
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United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana. 
Gary DANNA, Sr. 
v. 
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY and Continental 
Casualty Company 
Civ. A. No. 95-3061. 
April 12,1996. 
ORDER AND REASONS 
BERRIGAN, District Judge: 
*1 Defendant Continental Casualty Company ("CCC 
") moves for summary judgment on the grounds that 
the state law claims alleged in plaintiffs Petition for 
Damages are preempted by the Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA" 
), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Defendant further alleges 
that it is entitled to summary judgment as plaintiff is 
not "disabled" as required by the disability 
insurance policy issued by CCC. The matter was 
submitted on a previous date without oral argument. 
Having reviewed the record, the submissions of the 
parties and the applicable law, defendant's motion is 
GRANTED.™1 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Gary Danna ("Danna") initiated this action 
on August 24, 1995 to recover benefits to which he 
was allegedly entitled under the terms of the policy 
of disability insurance issued by CCC to his 
employer, Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.™2 On 
September 18, 1995, CCC removed this case to 
federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) 
because the plan of insurance which allegedly 
insured Danna is governed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 
1001 et seq. as well as diversity jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. CCC now moves for 
summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs state law 
claims against CCC because the state law claims 
alleged in plaintiffs Petition for Damages are 
preempted by ERISA. In addition, CCC moves for 
summary judgment dismissing the remainder of 
Danna's claims on the grounds that Danna is not " 
disabled" as required by the CCC disability policy 
and is therefore not entitled to benefits under that 
policy. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that summary judgment is proper "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." The non-mo vant's 
burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact " 
is not satisfied with 'some metaphysical doubt as to 
the material facts,' by 'conclusory allegations,' or by 
only a 'scintilla' of evidence." Little v. Liquid Air 
Corporation, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(e« 
banc). Further, "factual controversies [are resolved] 
in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when 
there is an actual controversy, that is, when both 
parties have submitted evidence of contradictory 
facts." Id. 
In essence, "[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold 
inquiry of determining whether there is the need for 
a trial — whether, in other words, there are any 
genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved 
only by a finder of fact because they may 
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party" 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 250, 
106 S.Ct. 2505,2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). 
Under these standards, the Court finds that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact as to plaintiffs 
disability, and defendant is therefore entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.1^3 Pursuant to the 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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CCC policy, a claimant is entitled to benefits if he 
or she is totally disabled The policy provides that 
*2 "Total Disability" means that, the Insured 
Employee, because of Injury or Sickness, is 
(1) continuously unable to engage in any occupation 
for which he is or becomes qualified by education, 
training or experience, and 
(2) under the regular care of a licensed physician 
other than himself FN4 
The Court finds that plaintiff is not disabled within 
the meaning of the CCC policy as plaintiff is not 
under the regular care of a licensed physician 
Defendant indicates, and plaintiff does not dispute, 
that plaintiff was not under the care of a physician 
when he was denied disability benefits as required 
under the disability policy Danna was denied 
disability benefits on July 3, 1995 and on that date, 
the last medical record which Danna submitted to 
CCC was dated August 24, 1994FN5 Although a 
claim form dated November 22, 1994 was 
completed by Dr Russo, plaintiffs physician, there 
is no indication that plaintiff was present or was 
treated that day™6 Because pursuant to the CCC 
policy, a claimant is only entitled to benefits if he or 
she is under the regular care of a licensed physician 
other than himself, and Danna had not been treated 
m eleven months, Danna no longer met the 
definition of "disabled" under the CCC policy as of 
July 3, 1995 Therefore, at the time that plaintiffs 
disability benefits were terminated, plaintiff was not 
disabled withm the meaning of disability under 
defendant's disability policy 
III CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that at the time that plaintiffs 
benefits were terminated, he did not meet the 
definition of disabled as provided for under the 
CCC policy as plaintiff was not under the regular 
care of a licensed physician at that time 
Accordmgly, 
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for 
summary judgment is GRANTED 
FN1 The Court notes that plaintiff has not 
filed an opposition to defendant's motion 
for summary judgment Rather, the Court 
has received a letter from plaintiffs 
attorney to the effect that plaintiff will not 
be submitting any opposition to 
defendant's motion based upon the 
deposition testimony of Dr Courtney 
Russo, plaintiffs physician 
FN2 Plaintiff originally sued CNA 
Insurance Company However, CNA is a 
service mark registered with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Agency and 
is not a legal entity CNA was therefore an 
improper party to this suit The plaintiff 
and CNA filed a Jomt Motion to Dismiss 
CNA, and the plaintiff amended his 
petition to name CCC as the proper party 
defendant SeeR Doc 9 
FN3 Because the Court finds that plaintiff 
does not meet the requirements for 
disability benefits under the disability 
policy, the Court does not reach the issue 
of preemption 
FN4 Memorandum m Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, R Doc 14, Exh 
Aatp 3 
FN5 Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p 6, R Doc 14 
FN6 Memorandum m Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Exh E, R Doc 
14 
ED La,1996 
Danna, Sr v CNA Ins Co 
Not Reported in F Supp, 1996 WL 180058 
(EDLa) 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 78. Judicial Code 
Part I. Courts 
K& Chapter 2A. Court of Appeals 
-•§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, 
State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, 
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive 
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, 
and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state 
or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons 
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or 
capital felony; 
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(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, 
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, 
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges 
of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and 
determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 
46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 
Laws 1986, c. 47, § 46; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 304; Laws 1988, c. 73, § 1; Laws 
1988, c. 210, § 141; Laws 1988, c. 248, § 8; Laws 1990, c. 80, § 5; Laws 1990, 
c. 224, § 3; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 22; Laws 1992, c. 127, § 12; Laws 1994, c. 
13, § 45; Laws 1995, c. 299, § 47, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 159, § 19, 
eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 198, § 49, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 2001, c. 
255, § 20, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001, c. 302, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Military court, see §§ 39-6-15 and 39-6-16. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Administrative Law and Procedure C^>651 to 686, 721 to 726. 
Courts €=3207, 248, 483 to 488. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k207; 106k248; 15Ak651 to 15Ak686; 15Ak721 
to 15Ak726; 106k483 to 106k488. 
C.J.S. Courts §§ 193 to 202. 
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure §§ 172 to 201, 204, 208 to 212, 
218 to 219, 259 to 271. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
150 BNA Daily Report for Executives K-16, 1999, Property Taxes: Facts. 
150 BNA Daily Tax Report K-16, 1999, Property Taxes: Facts. 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
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Appellate jurisdiction, 
Adoption, jurisdiction of Supreme Court, review of state court's 
interpretation 
of state law, due process, see O'Connell v. Kirchner, U.S.Ill.1995, 115 
S.Ct. 891, 513 U.S. 1303, 130 L.Ed.2d 873. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
In general 1 
Administrative entity determinations 5 
Appeals from courts not of record 3 
Attorney fees 8 
Criminal convictions 6 
Extradition orders 7 
Final judgments and orders 4 
Issuance of prerogative or remedial writs 9 
Mandamus 10 
Original appellate jurisdiction, generally 2 
1. In general 
District court did not have appellate jurisdiction over defendant's challenge to 
circuit court orders binding defendants over for trial, in absence of any 
statutory delegation of appellate jurisdiction to district court; legislature 
vested appellate jurisdiction over circuit court proceedings in Court of Appeals. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-15, 77-35-7, 78-2a-3(2)(d), 78-3- 4(5). State v. Humphrey, 
1990, 794 P.2d 496, certiorari granted 804 P.2d 1232, reversed 823 P.2d 464. 
Criminal Law €^> 1018 
Failure of defendant to file direct appeal before seeking postconviction relief 
was not a jurisdictional defect which would prevent the Court of Appeals from 
reviewing the district court's decision denying habeas corpus. U.C.A.1953, 
78-2a-3(f). Gomm v. Cook, 1988, 754 P.2d 1226. Habeas Corpus €^ => 813 
2. Original appellate jurisdiction, generally 
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction over a district court's 
review of a city council's decisions on zoning issues. U.C.A.1953, 78-2- 2(3) (j), 
78-2a-3(2) (b) (i) . Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2001, 17 P.3d 1160, 412 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26, 413 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 2001 UT App 9, certiorari granted 26 P. 3d 235, 
vacated 70 P.3d 47, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2003 UT 16. Zoning And Planning €^> 741 
3. Appeals from courts not of record 
Magistrate was not "court of record, " and thus Court of Appeals did not have 
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal from magistrate's order binding defendant 
over for trial on refiled felony charge. Const. Art. 8, § 5; U.C.A.1953, 
78-2a-3(2)(d). State v. Fisk, 1998, 966 P.2d 860, 353 Utah Adv. Rep. 34. 
Criminal Law €=> 1023(3) 
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4. Final judgments and orders 
Employer's petition for review was filed prematurely with Court of Appeals, before 
Labor Commission's final agency action denying employer's motion for 
reconsideration of award in favor of injured worker, despite fact that employer 
filed within statutorily specified period after motion was "considered denied" by 
Commission's inaction on motion, where Commission could and did change "considered 
denied" date to later date, and thus, Court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
employer's appeal. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l(9), 63-46b-13(3) (b), 78-2a-3 (2) (a) . 
McCoy v. Utah Disaster Kleenup, 2003, 65 P. 3d 643, 467 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 2003 UT 
App 49. Workers' Compensation €^> 1875 
5. Administrative entity determinations 
Labor Commission's interim order finding that workers' compensation claimant 
qualified for permanent total disability was not final and appealable order, even 
though administrative rule stated that preliminary determination of permanent 
total disability, by Labor Commission or Appeals Board, was final agency action 
for purposes of appellate judicial review, where statute, which controlled over 
administrative rule, provided that finding by Commission of permanent total 
disability was not final, unless otherwise agreed by parties, until reemployment 
plan was prepared and considered, and parties agreed this had not occurred. 
Target Trucking v. Labor Com'n, 2005, 108 P. 3d 128, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 2005 UT 
App 70. Workers' Compensation €^> 1833 
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction over district court review of 
land use decisions by local government entities, since Supreme Court has original 
appellate jurisdiction over orders over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original jurisdiction, and Court of Appeals did not have original jurisdiction to 
hear challenges to land use decisions by municipal governing bodies; there was no 
statutory provision that expressly granted the Court of Appeals original 
jurisdiction over district court review of land use decisions by local 
governmental entities. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i). Bradley v. Payson City 
Corp., 2003, 70 P.3d 47, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 2003 UT 16. Courts €^> 206(17.1) 
Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider company's petition for 
review regarding conversion of citation proceeding based on hiring of unlicensed 
electricians to perform electrical construction work from informal to formal 
adjudicative proceeding by Department of Commerce, Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing; conversion order was not final order. U.C.A.1953, 
63-46b-16, 78-2a-3(2) (a); U.C.A.1953(1993 Ed.), 58- 55-2(32) (C). Merit Elec. & 
Instrumentation v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, 1995, 902 P. 2d 151. Administrative Law And Procedure €^> 704; Licenses 
€=^ > 41 
Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to review orders that reserve 
something for further decision by agency. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16, 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing, 1995, 902 P.2d 151. Administrative Law And Procedure €=> 
704 
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"Collateral order doctrine," which allows review of orders that conclusively 
determine disputed question, resolve important issue completely separate from 
merits of action, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment 
would not be applied to appeal from administrative action. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-16, 
78-2a-3(2) (a). Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, Div. of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, 1995, 902 P. 2d 151. Administrative Law 
And Procedure €==> 7 04 
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over petition for extraordinary writ challenging 
denial of motion to recuse presiding officer of Division of Environmental Response 
and Remediation (DERR) based on fact that presiding officer was also staff 
attorney. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l(3) (a), 78-2a-3 (1) (b) . V-l Oil Co. v. Department 
of Environmental Quality, Div. of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 1995, 893 P. 2d 1093, 
certiorari granted 910 P. 2d 425, reversed 939 P. 2d 1192, 317 Utah Adv. Rep. 11. 
Administrative Law And Procedure €==> 657.1; Environmental Law €=> 634 
Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to review decision by division of police 
officer standards and training (POST) not to pursue decertification of wildlife 
conservation officer; since POST did not conduct any formal proceedings, there 
was no final order resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, and citizen's 
filing of complaint with POST did not require it to conduct formal proceedings. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l et seq., 63-46b-16, 78-2a-3 (2) (a). Nielson v. Division of 
Peace Officer Standards and Training, (POST), Dept. of Public Safety, 1993, 851 
P.2d 1201. Administrative Law And Procedure €^> 704; Game €=> 6 
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to rule on whether the Tax Commission complied 
with remand order of the Supreme Court, notwithstanding claim of Commission that 
its decision on remand was not a final appealable order because decision called 
for a further proceeding; appeal was an enforcement proceeding to determine if 
Commission complied with remand order, and Supreme Court has jurisdiction by 
statute to issue all process necessary to carry into effect its orders; since 
case was transferred, Court of Appeals stood m shoes of Supreme Court. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-2-2(2), 78-2a-3 (1) (a) , (2) (k) . Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State 
Tax Com'n, 1993, 848 P.2d 715, certiorari granted 860 P.2d 943, reversed 874 P.2d 
840. Taxation €=^ > 2693 
Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction, pursuant to statute granting Court 
jurisdiction to review final agency actions resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings, to review Division of Occupational and Professional Licensingfs 
administrative law judge's denial of motion to dismiss unprofessional conduct 
petitions filed against person licensed to administer health facility, even though 
licensee had petitioned to have order reviewed by Division and such review was 
denied. U.C.A.1953, 13-1-12 (1) (a), 63-46b-16(1) . Barney v. Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, Dept. of Commerce, 1992, 828 P. 2d 542, 
certiorari denied 843 P.2d 516. Health €==> 223(1) 
Court of Appeals would not defer ruling on jurisdictional issue until 
consideration of merits of appeal from administrative law judge's denial of motion 
to dismiss professional conduct petitions filed against person licensed to 
administer health facility, since Court's first duty was to determine whether it 
had jurisdiction. U.C.A.1953, 13-1-12 (1) (a), 63-46b-16 (1) . Barney v. Division of 
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Occupational and Professional Licensing, Dept. of Commerce, 1992, 828 P. 2d 542, 
certiorari denied 843 P.2d 516. Health €=^ 223(1) 
Statute giving the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction over final orders and 
decrees of state and local agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
them defines the outermost limit of the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction 
and allows it to review agency decisions only when the legislature expressly 
autho-rizes a right of review. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3 (2) (a) . DeBry v. Salt Lake 
County Bd. of Appeals, 1988, 764 P. 2d 627. Administrative Law And Procedure €=> 
663; Administrative Law And Procedure 0=? 681.1 
In the absence of specific statute creating right to judicial review of order of 
county board of appeals, Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction. U.C.A.1953, 
78-2a-3(2)(a). DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 1988, 764 P.2d 627. 
Administrative Law And Procedure €=> 663 
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear appeal from district court order 
affirming administrative suspension of license to operate a cosmetology/barbering 
school. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3; U.C.A.1953, 58-1-36 (Repealed); Const. Art. 8, § 5 
; Const. Art. 8, § 9 (Repealed); Court of Appeals Rule 4A. Scientific Academy 
of Hair Design, Inc. v. Bowen, 1987, 738 P.2d 242. Administrative Law And 
Procedure C^> 681.1; Licenses C ^ 38 
6. Criminal convictions 
Statefs ability to take appeal in criminal case is limited. Rules Crim.Proc, 
Rule 26(3). State v. Quinn, 1996, 930 P.2d 267, 305 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 309 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 11, rehearing denied. Criminal Law €=> 1024(1) 
State could not take interlocutory appeal of magistrate's order denying its 
request to enhance defendant's driving under the influence (DUI) charge to 
third-degree felony, as order did not fit within any of categories of appealable 
decisions. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 26(3). State v. Quinn, 1996, 930 P.2d 267, 305 
Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 309 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, rehearing denied. Criminal Law £=> 
1024(9) 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over appeals from orders on petitions for 
extraordinary writ which challenge the conviction of or sentence for first-degree 
felony or capital felony. U.C.A.1953, 78-2-2 (3) (j), 78-2a-3 (2) (h) . Neel v. 
Holden, 1994, 886 P.2d 1097. Habeas Corpus €=> 813 
Because petitioner was not challenging his conviction or sentence, he should have 
appealed dismissal of his habeas corpus petition to Court of Appeals rather than 
Supreme Court. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3(2)(g). Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 1991, 
820 P.2d 473. Courts €==> 248 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over direct appeal of first degree or capital 
felony conviction and over petition for extraordinary writ used as substitute for 
direct appeal of such conviction or sentence; Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
in all other cases. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3 (2) (g) . Northern v. Barnes, 1991, 814 
P.2d 1148, certiorari granted 843 P.2d 1042. Courts €=> 248; Criminal Law €=? 
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1018; Criminal Law €=> 1019; Criminal Law €=? 1020 
Writ challenging postconviction actions of Board of Pardons was properly before 
Court of Appeals where it did not challenge conviction in trial court or sentence; 
fact that defendant was serving sentence for first-degree felony did not require 
transfer to Supreme Court. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3(2)(g). Northern v. Barnes, 1991, 
814 P.2d 1148, certiorari granted 843 P.2d 1042. Courts €==> 248 
When sentencing judge reduces conviction, appeal lies in court having jurisdiction 
of degree of crime recorded in judgment of conviction and for which defendant is 
sentenced, rather than degree of crime charged in information or found in verdict. 
U.C.A.1953, 76-3-402, 78-2-2(3)(i), 78-2a-3(2)(f). State v. Doung, 1991, 813 
P.2d 1168. Criminal Law €=> 1019 
Under statute granting Court of Appeals original appellate jurisdiction over 
appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs "involving a criminal 
conviction," Court of Appeals lacked original appellate jurisdiction of appeal 
from denial of extraordinary writ involving an interstate transfer of a prisoner, 
which bore no relation to the underlying criminal conviction except that, "but 
for" the conviction, he would not have been incarcerated in Arizona and then 
transferred to Utah. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3, 78-2a-3 (2) (g) . Ellis v. DeLand, 1989, 
783 P.2d 559, transferred to 786 P.2d 231. Habeas Corpus €^> 813 
7. Extradition orders 
Court of Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction over appeal by prisoner held for 
extradition to Idaho in Utah county jail from district court's denial of 
prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to statute providing 
subject matter jurisdiction of appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs involving criminal convictions; language of the statute is sufficiently 
broad to include those cases in which criminal conviction is involved in habeas 
corpus proceeding to challenge extradition. U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-3 (2) (g) . Hernandez 
v. Hayward, 1988, 764 P. 2d 993. Habeas Corpus €==> 813 
8. Attorney fees 
When party who prevails on appeal in divorce action, yet was not awarded fees at 
trial, claims attorney fees on appeal solely on basis of new allegations of change 
in financial condition and those allegations are not a matter of record and have 
not been adjudicated by finder of fact, Court of Appeals cannot evaluate claim; 
prevailing party's claim for attorney fees on appeal based on allegation of need 
must be addressed by trial court to determine need of claiming spouse, ability of 
other spouse to pay, reasonableness of fees and amount, if any, to be paid. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3, 78-2a-3. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 1994, 875 P.2d 598. 
Divorce €=> 287 
9. Issuance of prerogative or remedial writs 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction, under statutory exception to Court of Appeals' 
jurisdiction over appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs 
challenging decisions of Board of Pardons, to hear original direct appeal from 
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district court's unconditional order of release on prisoner's petition challenging 
decision made at his original parole grant hearing which fixed length of his 
prison stay for two first-degree felonies. U.C.A.1953, 78-2- 2(3) (j), 
78-2a-3 (2) (g, h) ; Rules App.Proc, Rule 44. Preece v. House, 1994, 886 P.2d 508. 
Courts €=> 248 
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over petition for extraordinary writ; by 
issuing writ sought by petition, court would only be carrying into effect its 
judgments, orders and decree in previous cases directing judge to comply with Rule 
63(b) with respect to several of petitioner's cases. U.C.A.1953, 78- 2a-3(l)(a); 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 63(b). Barnard v. Murphy, 1994, 882 P.2d 679. Courts €=> 
207.1 
Where Court of Appeals had appellate jurisdiction over subject matter of divorce 
case in which petitioner who filed petition for extraordinary writ had been a 
party, Court of Appeals had authority to issue necessary writs in connection with 
that case, even if no appeal was pending. U.C.A. 1953, 78- 2a-3(l) (b) . Barnard v. 
Murphy, 1994, 882 P.2d 679. Courts €^> 207.1 
10. Mandamus 
Court's decision to grant or deny petition for extraordinary relief in nature of 
mandamus is discretionary with court to which petition is brought, in sense that 
it is never matter of right on behalf of applicant. V-l Oil Co. v. Department of 
Environmental Quality, Div. of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 1997, 939 P. 2d 1192, 317 
Utah Adv. Rep. 11. Mandamus C=^ > 7 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-2a-3, UT ST § 78-2a-3 
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Effective: March 29,2000 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 15. Commerce and Trade 
"i Chapter 22. Trademarks (Refs & Annos) 
*i Subchapter III. General Provisions 
-•§ 1127. Construction and definitions; intent of chapter 
In the construction of this chapter, unless the contrary is plainly apparent from the context-
The United States includes and embraces all territory which is under its jurisdiction and control. 
The word "commerce" means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress. 
The term "principal register" refers to the register provided for by sections 1051 to 1072 of this title, and the term 
"supplemental register" refers to the register provided for by sections 1091 to 1096 of this title. 
The term "person" and any other word or term used to designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or 
privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter includes a juristic person as well as a natural 
person. The term "juristic person" includes a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable 
of suing and being sued in a court of law. 
The term "person" also includes the United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, or any individual, firm, or 
corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States. The United 
States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, and any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States 
and with the authorization and consent of the United States, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the 
same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. 
The term "person" also includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or 
instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or 
employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any 
nongovernmental entity. 
The terms "applicant" and "registrant" embrace the legal representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns of 
such applicant or registrant. 
The term "Director" means the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office. 
The term "related company" means any person whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the mark with 
respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used. 
The terms "trade name" and "commercial name" mean any name used by a person to identify his or her business or 
vocation. 
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The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof-
(1) used by a person, or 
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register 
established by this chapter, 
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others 
and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown. 
The term "service mark" means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof-
(1) used by a person, or 
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register 
established by this chapter, 
to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of others and to 
indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown. Titles, character names, and other distinctive 
features of radio or television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the 
programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor. 
The term "certification mark" means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof-
(1) used by a person other than its owner, or 
(2) which its owner has a bona fide intention to permit a person other than the owner to use in commerce and 
files an application to register on the principal register established by this chapter, 
to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such 
person's goods or services or that the work or labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union 
or other organization. 
The term "collective mark" means a trademark or service mark— 
(1) used by the members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization, or 
(2) which such cooperative, association, or other collective group or organization has a bona fide intention to use 
in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, 
and includes marks indicating membership in a union, an association, or other organization. 
The term "mark" includes any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark. 
The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made 
merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in 
commerce--
(1) on goods when-
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the 
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tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on 
documents associated with the goods or their sale, and 
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and 
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in 
commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and 
the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services. 
A mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned" if either of the following occurs: 
(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred 
from circumstances. Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment. "Use" of a 
mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve 
a right in a mark. 
(2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark 
to become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to 
lose its significance as a mark. Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining abandonment under this 
paragraph. 
The term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or 
services, regardless of the presence or absence of— 
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or 
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. 
The term "colorable imitation" includes any mark which so resembles a registered mark as to be likely to cause 
confusion or mistake or to deceive. 
The term "registered mark" means a mark registered in the United States Patent and Trademark Office under this 
chapter or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or the Act of March 19, 1920. The 
phrase "marks registered in the Patent and Trademark Office" means registered marks. 
The term "Act of March 3, 1881", "Act of February 20, 1905", or "Act of March 19, 1920", means the respective 
Act as amended. 
A "counterfeit" is a spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark. 
The term "domain name" means any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain 
name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic address 
on the Internet. 
The term "Internet" has the meaning given that term in section 230(f)(1) of Title 47. 
Words used in the singular include the plural and vice versa. 
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the 
deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from 
interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair 
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competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or 
colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions 
respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign 
nations. 
CREDIT(S) 
(July 5, 1946, c. 540, Title X, § 45, 60 Stat. 443; Oct. 9, 1962, Pub.L. 87-772, § 21, 76 Stat. 774; Jan. 2, 1975, 
Pub.L. 93-596, § 1, 88 Stat. 1949; Nov. 8, 1984, Pub.L. 98-620, Title I, § 103, 98 Stat. 3335; Nov. 16, 1988, 
Pub.L. 100-667, Title I, § 134, 102 Stat. 3946; Oct. 27, 1992, Pub.L. 102-542, § 3(d), 106 Stat. 3568; Dec. 8, 
1994, Pub.L. 103-465, Title V, § 521, 108 Stat. 4981; Jan. 16, 1996, Pub.L. 104-98, § 4, 109 Stat. 986; Aug. 5, 
1999, Pub.L. 106-43, §§ 4(c), 6(b), 113 Stat. 219, 220; Nov. 29, 1999, Pub.L. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9) [Title 
III, § 3005, Title IV, § 4732(b)(1)(A)], 113 Stat. 1536,1501A-550,1501A-583.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
1946 Acts. Senate Report No. 1333, see 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Service, p. 1274. 
1962 Acts. Senate Report No. 2107, see 1962 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 2844. 
1975 Acts. Senate Report No. 93-1399, see 1974 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 7113. 
1984 Acts. House Report No. 98-1062, see 1984 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 5708. 
1988 Acts. Senate Report No. 100-515 and House Report No. 100-887(Parts I and II), see 1988 U.S. Code Cong, 
and Adm. News, p. 5577. 
1992 Acts. Senate Report No. 102-280, see 1992 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 3087. 
1994 Acts. House Report No. 103-826(Parts I and II) and Statement of Administrative Action, see 1994 U.S. Code 
Cong, and Adm. News, p. 3773. 
1996 Acts. House Report No. 104-374, see 1995 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 1029. 
1999 Acts. Statement by President, see 1999 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 290. 
References in Text 
"This chapter", referred to in text, originally read "this Act", meaning the Trademark Act of 1946, which is 
classified principally to this chapter. See Tables for complete classification. 
Acts March 3, 1881, February 20, 1905, and March 19, 1920, referred to in text, are Acts Mar. 3, 1881, c. 138, 21 
Stat. 502; Feb. 20, 1905, c. 592, 33 Stat. 724; and Mar. 19, 1920, c. 104, 41 Stat. 553, which were repealed 
insofar as inconsistent with this chapter by act July 5, 1946, c. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 444. Act Feb. 20, 1905, was 
classified to §§ 81 to 109 of this title. Act Mar. 19, 1920, had been generally classified to §§ 121 to 128 of this 
title. 
Amendments 
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1999 Amendments. Pub.L. 106-113 [Title III, § 3004], inserted after the undesignated paragraph defining the term 
"counterfeit" the following: 
"The term 'domain name' means any alphanumeric designation which is registered with or assigned by any domain 
name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic address 
on the Internet. 
"The term 'Internet' has the meaning given that term in section 230(f)(1) of Title 47." 
Pub.L. 106-113 [§ 4732(b)(1)(A)], struck out the par. which read: "The term 'Commissioner' means the 
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks", and inserted "The term 'Director' means the Under Secretary of 
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office". 
Pub.L. 106-43, § 4(c), added the par. in the definition of "person" relating to the United States. 
Pub.L. 106-43, § 6(b), struck out "trade-marks" and inserted "trademarks" each place it appeared. 
1996 Amendments. Pub.L. 104-98, § 4, added provisions defining term "dilution" as the lessening of the capacity 
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of 
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or likelihood of confusion, mistake, or 
deception. 
1994 Amendments. Pub.L. 103-465, § 521, in provision defining "abandoned" substituted provision that nonuse 
for 3 consecutive years be prima facie evidence of abandonment for provision that nonuse for two consecutive 
years be prima facie evidence of abandonment. 
1992 Amendments. Pub.L. 102-542 inserted after fourth undesignated paragraph "The term 'person' also includes 
any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting 
in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the 
provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity." 
1988 Amendments. Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(1), amended par. defining "related company" generally. Prior to 
amendment, par. read as follows: "The teim 'related company1 means any person who legitimately controls or is 
controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services 
in connection with which the mark is used." 
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(2), amended par. defining "trade name" and "commercial name" generally. Prior to 
amendment, par. read as follows: "The terms 'trade name' and 'commercial name' include individual names and 
surnames, firm names and trade names used by manufacturers, industrialists, merchants, agriculturists, and others 
to identify their businesses, vocations, or occupations; the names or titles lawfully adopted and used by persons, 
firms, associations, corporations, companies, unions, and any manufacturing, industrial, commercial, agricultural, 
or other organizations engaged in trade or commerce and capable of suing and being sued in a court of law." 
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(3), amended par. defining "trademark" generally. Prior to amendment, par. read as follows: 
"The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used 
by a manufacturer or merchant to identify and distinguish his goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown." 
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(4), amended par. defining "service mark" generally. Prior to amendment, par. read as 
follows: "The term 'service mark' means a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify and 
distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of others and to indicate the 
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source of the services, even if that source is unknown. Titles, character names and other distinctive features of 
radio or television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may 
advertise the goods of the sponsor." 
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(5), amended par. defining "certification mark" generally. Prior to amendment, par. read as 
follows: "The term 'certification mark' means a mark used upon or in connection with the products or services of 
one or more persons other than the owner of the mark to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of 
manufacture, quality, accuracy or other characteristics of such goods or services or that the work or labor on the 
goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization." 
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(6), amended par. defining "collective mark" generally. Prior to amendment, par. read as 
follows: "The term 'collective mark' means a trademark or service mark used by the members of a cooperative, an 
association or other collective group or organization and includes marks used to indicate membership in a union, 
an association or other organization." 
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(7), amended par. defining "mark" generally. Prior to amendment, par. read as follows: 
"The term 'mark' includes any trade-mark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark entitled to 
registration under this chapter whether registered or not." 
Pub.L. 100-667, § 134(8), substituted par. defining "use in commerce" for former par. which read as follows: "For 
the purposes of this chapter a mark shall be deemed to be used in commerce (a) on goods when it is placed in any 
manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto 
and the goods are sold or transported in commerce and (b) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or 
advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one 
State or in this and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection 
therewith." and par. providing when a mark is deemed abandoned for former par. which read as follows: "A mark 
shall be deemed to be 'abandoned'--
"(a) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume. Intent not to resume may be inferred from 
circumstances. Nonuse for two consecutive years shall be prima facie abandonment. 
"(b) When any course of conduct of the registrant, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the 
mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin. Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining 
abandonment under this subparagraph." 
1984 Amendments. Pub.L. 98-620, § 103(1), in definition of "trademark" substituted "trademark" for 
"trade-mark", and substituted "identify and distinguish his goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown" for 
"identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others". 
Pub.L. 98-620, § 103(2), in definition of "service mark" substituted "The tenn 'service mark' means a mark used in 
the sale or advertising of services to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, 
from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown" for "The term 
'service mark' means a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one person and 
distinguish them from the services of others". 
Pub.L. 98-620, § 103(3), in subpar. (b) of par. relating to when a mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned", 
inserted "Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining abandonment under this subparagraph." 
1975 Amendments. Pub.L. 93-596 substituted "Patent and Trademark Office" for "Patent Office" in two places and 
"Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks" for "Commissioner of Patents" in the definition of "Commissioner". 
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1962 Amendments. Pub.L. 87-772 substituted, "predecessors," for "and" in the definition of "applicant" and 
"registrant", "Titles, character names and other distinctive features of radio or television programs may be 
registered as service marks notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor" for 
"and includes without limitation the marks, names, symbols, titles, designations, slogans, character names, and 
distinctive features of radio or other advertising used in commerce", in the definition of "service mark", inserted 
"or the services are rendered in more than one State or in this and a foreign country and the person rendering the 
services is engaged in commerce in connection therewith" in the fifteenth paragraph relating to use in commerce, 
struck out "purchasers" after "deceive" in the definition of "colorable imitation", and substituted "commerce" for 
"commence" in last paragraph relating to the intent of the chapter. 
Effective and Applicability Provisions 
1999 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 106-113 [§ 3005] to apply to all domain names registered before, on, or after the 
date of enactment of this Act [Nov. 29, 1999, which is the date of enactment of Pub.L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 
which in Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), enacted into law this Act as an Appendix], see Pub.L. 106-113 [§ 3010], set out as a 
note under section 1117 of this title. 
Amendment by Pub.L. 106-113 [§ 4732(b)(1)(A)], effective 4 months after the date of enactment of this Act [Nov. 
29, 1999, which is the date of enactment of Pub.L. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, which in Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), enacted 
into law this Act as an Appendix], see Pub.L. 106-113 [§ 4731], set out as a note under section 1 of Title 35. 
1996 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 104-98 effective on Jan. 16, 1996, see section 5 of Pub.L. 104-98, set out as a 
note under section 1125 of this title. 
1994 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 103-465 effective one year after the date on which the WTO Agreement enters 
into force with respect to the United States [Jan. 1, 1995], see section 523 of Pub.L. 103-465, set out as a note 
under section 1052 of this title. 
1992 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 102-542 effective with respect to violations that occur on or after Oct. 27, 1992, 
see section 4 of Pub.L. 102-542, set out as a note under section 1114 of this title. 
1988 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 100-667 effective one year after Nov. 16, 1988, see section 136 of Pub.L. 
100-667, set out as a note under section 1051 of this title. 
1975 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 93-596 effective Jan. 2, 1975, see § 4 of Pub.L. 93-596, set out as a note under § 
1111 of this title. 
Transfer of Functions 
For transfer of functions of other officers, employees, and agencies of the Department of Commerce, with certain 
exceptions, to the Secretary of Commerce, with power to delegate, see Reorg. Plan No. 5 of 1950, §§ 1,2, eff. May 
24, 1950, 15 F.R. 3174, 64 Stat. 1263, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees. 
Repeal and Effect on Existing Rights 
Repeal of inconsistent provisions, effect of this chapter on pending proceedings and existing registrations and 
rights under prior acts, see notes under § 1051 of this title. 
Prior Provisions 
Acts Feb. 20,1905, c. 592, § 29, 33 Stat. 731; June 10, 1938, c. 332, § 5, 52 Stat. 639. 
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CROSS REFERENCES 
Customs duties, forfeitures and penalty for aiding unlawful importation, see 19 USCA § 1595a. 
Seizure of merchandise bearing counterfeit mark, see 19 USCA § 1526. 
LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES 
A dilution delusion: The unjustifiable protection of similar marks. Comment, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1023 
(2004). 
A primer on trademarks and service marks. Lawrence E. Evans, Jr., 18 St.Mary's L.J. 137 (1986). 
A primer on trademarks and service marks for the general practitioner. Lawrence E. Evans, Jr., 50 Tex.B.J. 
258 (1987). 
Color conundrum continues: Master Distributors v. Pako and Qualitex v. Jacobson Products. 24 
Cumb.L.Rev. 299 (1994). 
Color me bad: A new solution to the debate over color trademark registration. Richard J. Berman, 63 
Geo.Wash.LRev. I l l (1994). 
Disclosure and good cause legislation: "Where's the Beef in franchise regulation? Mark Pruitt, 90 
Com.L.J. 563 (1985). 
Enforcement costs and trademark puzzles. Robert G. Bone, 90 Va. L. Rev. 2099 (2004). 
Foreign trademark owner living with American products liability law. Arthur Schwartz, 12 N.C.J.Int'l L. & 
Com.Reg. 375 (1987). 
Franchising and consumers' beliefs about "tied" products: The death knell for Krehl? Robert W. Emerson, 
45 Fla.L.Rev. 163(1993). 
Having it your way: Slogans as marketing tools. Gerald E. Helget, 62 Hennepin Law. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1992). 
In rem jurisdiction from Pennoyer to Shaffer to the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. Michael 
P. Allen, 11 Geo.Mason L.Rev. 243 (Winter, 2002), 
Keeping the home team at home: Antitrust and trademark law as weapons in the fight against professional 
sports franchise relocation. Comment, 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1065 (2004). 
Lawyer's ramble down the information superhighway. 64 Fordham L.Rev. 697 (1995). 
Licenses, trademarks, and bankruptcy, oh my!: trademark licensing and the perils of licensor bankruptcy. 
David M. Jenkins, 25 J.Marshall L.Rev. 143 (1991). 
Problem of concurrent use of trademarks: An old/new proposal. David S. Welkowitz, 28 U.RichX.Rev. 
315 (April 1994). 
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c 
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
-4RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any 
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. 
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time 
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of 
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court 
otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evxdence. When issues not raised by the pleading 
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in 
all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to 
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after 
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of 
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is 
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to 
be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the 
merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the 
objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to 
the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable 
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental 
pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened 
since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be 
granted even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim 
for relief or defense. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party 
plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time 
therefor. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17 
c 
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART IV. PARTIES 
-•RULE 17. PARTIES PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT 
(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of 
an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for 
the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's 
name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when 
a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be 
brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the 
ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a 
reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement 
of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and 
such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the 
action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 
(b) Minors or Incompetent Persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent person who 
is a party must appear either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litem 
appointed in the particular case by the court in which the action is pending. A 
guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it is deemed by the court in 
which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor, 
insane or incompetent person in the action or proceeding, notwithstanding that the 
person may have a general guardian and may have appeared by the guardian. In an 
action in rem it shall not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any 
unKnown party who might be a minor or an incompetent person. 
(c) Guardian Ad Litem; How Appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by a court 
must be appointed as follows: 
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if the minor 
is of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the application of a 
relative or friend of the minor. 
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if the minor is 
of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after the service of the 
summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so to apply, then upon the 
application of a relative or friend of the minor, or of any other party to the 
action. 
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon motion 
therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable person to be 
guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant or someone in 
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behalf of the defendant within 20 days after service of notice of such motion 
shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such minor. Service of such notice may 
be made upon the defendant's general or testamentary guardian located in the 
defendant's state; if there is none, such notice, together with the summons in 
the action, shall be served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon 
such minor, if over fourteen years of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by 
such service on the person with whom the minor resides. The guardian ad litem for 
such nonresident minor defendant shall have 20 days after appointment in which to 
plead to the action. 
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or proceeding, 
upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or incompetent person, 
or of any other party to the action or proceeding. 
(d) Associates May Sue or Be Sued by Common Name. When two or more persons 
associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other 
association, not a corporation, transact such business under a common name, 
whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they may sue or be sued 
by such common name. Any judgment obtained against the association shall bind the 
joint property of all the associates in the same manner as if all had been named 
parties and had been sued upon their joint liability. The separate property of an 
individual member of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the 
member is named as a party and the court acquires jurisdiction over the member. 
(e) Action Against a Nonresident Doing Business in This State. When a nonresident 
person is associated in and conducts business within the state of Utah in one or 
more places in that person's own name or a common trade name, and the business is 
conducted under the supervision of a manager, superintendent or agent the person 
may be sued in the person's name in any action arising out of the conduct of the 
business. 
(f) As used in these rules, the term plaintiff shall include a petitioner, and the 
term defendant shall include a respondent. 
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